Cannabinoids and the Brain introduces an informed general audience to the scientific discovery of the endocannabinoid system and recent preclinical research that explains its importance in brain functioning. The endocannabinoids, anandamide and 2-AG, act on the same cannabinoid receptors, that are activated by the primary psychoactive compound found in marijuana, Δ 9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Therefore, the scientific investigations of the functions of the endocannabinoid system are guided by the known effects of marijuana on the brain and body. The book reviews the scientific evidence of the role that the endocannabinoid system plays in regulating emotion, anxiety, depression, psychosis, reward and addiction, learning and memory, feeding, nausea/vomiting, pain, epilepsy, and other neurological disorders. Anecdotal reports are linked with the current scientific literature on the medicinal benefits of marijuana. Cannabis contains over 80 chemicals that have closely related structures, called cannabinoids, but the only major mood-altering constituent is THC. Another major plant cannabinoid is cannabidiol (CBD), which is not psychoactive; yet, considerable recent preclinical research reviewed in various chapters reveals that CBD has promising therapeutic potential in treatment of pain, anxiety, nausea and epilepsy. Only recently, has research been conducted with some of the other compounds found in cannabis. The subject matter of the book is extremely timely in light of the current ongoing debate not only about medical marijuana, but also about its legal status.
In this book I conceptualize various affective phenomena from the perspective of the "enactive" approach in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. I begin by arguing that affectivity is not a contingent psychological faculty, but an essential and pervasive dimension of our embodied existence, and more broadly of all living organisms (chapter 1). I then turn to existing affective-scientific accounts of the emotions (basic emotion theory, psychological constructionist approaches, the component process model), emphasising some of their main limitations (chapter 2), and then offering an enactive alternative that draws on dynamical systems theory and characterizes all emotional episodes as self-organizing patterns of the whole organism (chapter 3). Chapter 4 addresses the notion of "appraisal", highlighting and criticizing the widespread assumption that appraisal is an entirely brain-based cognitive process. In line with the enactive approach, I then reconceptualize appraisal as a thoroughly embodied and enactive phenomenon. Chapter 5 pays special attention to the phenomenology of affectivity, distinguishing various ways in which we feel our body when we experience emotions. In chapter 6 I turn to neuroscience, and in line with the "neurophenomenological" approach favoured by enactivism, I argue that an adequate neuroscientific account of emotion needs to integrate methods for the collection of data about brain and bodily activity with methods for the collection of data about experience. Finally, in chapter 7 I discuss the place of affectivity in intersubjectivity, distinguishing different ways in which we feel others (in empathy, sympathy, intimacy, etc.), and using these distinctions to make sense of empirical evidence of how our bodies respond to the physical presence of other people. The idea that a specific brain circuit constitutes the emotional brain (and its corollary, that cognition resides elsewhere) shaped thinking about emotion and the brain for many years. Recent behavioral, neuropsychological, neuroanatomy, and neuroimaging research, however, suggests that emotion interacts with cognition in the brain. This book moves beyond the debate over functional specialization, describing the many ways that emotion and cognition interact and are integrated in the brain. The amygdala is often viewed as the quintessential emotional region of the brain, but the book reviews findings revealing that many of its functions contribute to attention and decision making, critical components of cognitive functions. The book counters the idea of a subcortical pathway to the amygdala for affective visual stimuli with an alternate framework, the multiple waves model. Citing research on reward and motivation, the book also proposes the dual competition model, which explains emotional and motivational processing in terms of their influence on competition processes at both perceptual and executive function levels. The book considers the broader issue of structure-function mappings, and examines anatomical features of several regions often associated with emotional processing, highlighting their connectivity properties. The book argues that, as new theoretical frameworks of distributed processing evolve, a truly network view of the brain will emerge, in which "emotion" and "cognition" may be used as labels in the context of certain behaviors, but will not map cleanly into compartmentalized pieces of the brain. This chapter provides a brief background of the book, the collective contributions of modern pioneers of visual cognition. The book covers topics from spatial vision to the study of context, from rapid perception to emotion, from attention to memory, from psychology to computational neuroscience, and from single neurons to the human brain. The rest of the chapter provides a snapshot of visual recognition and the visual world, citing examples on scene understanding and the challenges in spatial vision. It points out that people store scene memories and their regularities in memory structures that are enhanced and fine-tuned with experience. It also notes that the brain combines different scene views across eye movements to fully understand and perceive the surroundings. What are the psychological foundations of morality? Historically, the issue has been framed as one of emotion versus reason. David Hume argued that reason is the slave of the passions and so morality must be based on them; Immanuel Kant argued that moral law is given by rational agents to themselves in virtue of their rationality. The debate has continued in these terms to the present day. This book argues that "reason" and "passion" do not satisfactorily capture all the important options for explaining the psychological foundations of morality. It proposes a third possibility: that the cognitive processes which make us moral agents are centrally constituted by features of our external environments. The book calls this the Wide Moral Systems Hypothesis (WMSH). The WMSH fits within an array of positions known as externalism or the Extended Mind Hypothesis, according to which the world outside our bodies is not just input to cognitive processes located within our brains but partially constitutes those processes. After explaining the WMSH, the book presents a series of more particular hypotheses about distinct aspects of our moral psychology: moral judgment, moral reasoning, the attribution of moral responsibility, and the production of action. It revisits overlooked externalist aspects of moral psychology, noting the integration of agent and environment found in existing research. This chapter presents a fictive experiment in which a person named Harry voluntarily undergoes neurosurgical operations by which various cognitive processes are reversibly abolished. This paves the way for asking: which cognitive processes can be "peeled away" from our mental lives before consciousness is lost? Which processes belong to the core that is essential for consciousness? We review the relevance of processes such as sensory processing and perception in various modalities (vision, hearing, etc.) , memory, emotions, motor behavior and language. Neurology and neuropsychology offer compelling cases for brain systems involved in perception and/or imagery as being essential for consciousness, whereas structures for memory, emotions, language and motor capacities appear less essential. This empirical evidence also argues against classic functionalism, which posits that a mental state acts as a causal intermediate between sensory input and motor output, because consciousness survives the long-lasting absence of motor behavior. As illustrated by clinical phenomena such as achromatopsia, the weight of evidence indicates that consciousness cannot be explained as simply having a discriminative state of groups of neurons, biasing or predisposing the organism toward specific actions. How should we conceptualize the relationships between conscious and nonconscious processing in some important decisions? This question is addressed in the context of an institutionally significant legal decisionthe reasoning processes engaged in by American jurors when rendering verdicts in typical criminal and civil trials. A cognitive-psychological process model for the juror's decision task is outlined and some of the behavioral evidence for the validity of that interpretation is presented. Thereafter, a discussion of the roles of conscious and nonconscious processes is provided within that framework. Decision making involves selection from sets of options based on current evidence about the state of the world and estimates of the value or utility of different outcomes. The neural correlates of evidence assessment that guide simple perceptual judgments are now well understood, and we argue that this process can serve as a simple model for organizing behavioral and neural correlates of decision making in more complex contexts, including those that involve economic transactions, social interaction, emotional stimulation, and conscious awareness. Bridging the methodological and theoretical gaps between simple and more complicated decision problems remains a fundamental, but in our view soluble, challenge for understanding the neurobiology of decision making.
Like-Minded

Peeling Off Our Conscious Lives
Conscious and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes in
The Strike-back emotions can be found in many species, including humans. Strike-back emotions are powerful, and may be essential to our moral lives; however, they are easily exploited and inflamed, and they are not legitimate guides to moral behavior. While strike-back emotions can be manipulated and intensified, they can also be ameliorated by careful deliberation; however, strong emotional reactions can block deliberative examination of causes. We discuss the interplay between applied ontology and the use of web resources in scientific and other domains, and provide an account of how ontologies are implemented computationally. We provide an introduction to the Protégé Ontology Editor, the Semantic Web, the Resource Description Framework (RDF) and the Web Ontology Language (OWL). We illustrated how BFO is used to provide the common architecture for specific domain ontologies, including the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS), the Infectious Disease Ontology (IDO), the Information Artifact Ontology (IAO), and the Emotion Ontology (MFO-EM). Before terms and relations provide the starting point for the creation of definition trees in such ontologies according to the Aristotelian strategy for authoring of definitions outlined in Chapter 4. We conclude with a discussion of the role of a top-level ontology such as BFO in facilitating semantic interoperability. How do organisms make decisions? The study of games and decisions has long been guided by a philosophical discourse on concepts of rationality and their implications. This discourse has led to a large body of mathematical work and kept generations of researchers busy, but few serious attempts have been made to understand decision making in the real world. Over the last decades, however, decision theory has moved toward the sciences and developed its "taste for the facts." Research is now guided by experimental economics, cognitive psychology, behavioral biology, and-most recently-neuroscience. Despite the increasingly empirical leanings of decision science, the explanatory power of evolutionary theory has been neglected. This Strüngmann Forum was convened to rectify this oversight, with the goal of initiating an alternative to the existing axiom-based decision theory by developing a theory of decision making founded on evolutionary principles. The abilities to feel distress at the suffering of others and to share in their joy are indicative of positive other-regarding concerns. The value to social decision making is intuitive: helping others feels good, harming them feels bad. Less intuitive are negative other-regarding concerns, taking satisfaction in the misfortunes of others and feeling sad at their successes and joys. Yet these sentiments also play a role in the choices humans make when interacting with others. This chapter explores otherregarding concerns and how they influence social decisions. The nature of other-regarding concerns is discussed, with an emphasis on the role of emotions in guiding human other-regarding preferences. Learning experiments with rats and other animals have impressively documented that learning is "prepared" by evolution. For social animals like humans, learning mechanisms are specifically adapted to social environments. This preparedness for social life is the key to understanding human sociality. It explains, for example, why humans often do smart things without having a clue of why they do them. It also explains why humans maintain behavioral habits over generations when these habits are no longer useful. To be prepared does not mean to be perfect. The bubbles that irritate our financial markets demonstrate this as well as the fact that winners in competitive economic interactions often experience what is called the winner's curse. In behavioral experiments, subjects do not learn to avoid the winner's curse. This reflects the downside of otherwise adaptive mental mechanisms described by learning direction theory. The bounded rationality captured through this theory has also positive aspects. It allows cooperation to occur in games where conventional game-theoretic wisdom would not give it a chance. Similarly, emotions play a crucial role in human decision making. They sometimes lead to irrational behavior but, at the same time, enable us to maintain cooperative institutions essential for human sociality.
Six Reasons for Invoking Evolution in Decision Theory
Item type: chapter Traditional and contemporary theories of emotion are reviewed in this chapter to highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses. Basic Emotions (BEs) and Higher Cognitive Emotions (HCEs) are described and their purported differences in terms of neurology, physiology and behavioural expression are highlighted. Feeling theories, cognitive (including dimensional appraisal) and social constructionist theories are discussed and objections to them raised. It is suggested that the focus of these theories on the nature of adult emotionality leads to a misconstrual of both the nature and function of the emotions. The chapter concludes in a discussion of types of scaffolding operational in emotional and language development. In this chapter I address the notion of "appraisal", which is central to the cognitive approach to emotion. I first trace the history of this notion, showing how the cognitive approach to emotion became progressively uninterested in the body in the 1960s and 1970s. Even though this trend has changed and cognitive emotion theorists today consider the body an important component of emotion, appraisal is still disembodied, namely seen as an entirely "heady" process distinct from the bodily components of emotion. I then outline an alternative, enactive conceptualization of appraisal that portrays it as both structurally and experientially embodied. I draw on recent neuroscientific accounts to undermine the distinction between cognition and emotion, and to emphasize the contribution of the whole organism to the process of evaluating its environment. I also develop various phenomenological considerations to argue that, at the level of experience, it is not plausible to separate appraisal from emotion (including its bodily aspects). This chapter discusses the components of empathy, including affective arousal and empathic concern, in relation to clinical practice, as well as the negative effects of excessive empathic arousal, including a lack of prosocial behavior and an increase of personal distress in physicians. It explores professional distress, burnout, and compassion fatigue resulting from poor emotion regulation, along with the methods to regulate empathy, including emotion suppression, framing, and exposure control. The chapter discusses the importance of developing empathytraining programs for physicians while keeping in mind the features of the empathic process, and concludes with the importance of physicians maintaining a balance regarding their empathic responses for successful patient interactions. This chapter examines the technologies of voice within videogames and how the voice is used as an extension not only of the principles underlying cinematic sound design but also of gameplay and game design. Drawing on an interview with Emily Ridgway, the Audio Lead of the game BioShock, it demonstrates how videogames rejuvenate the principles of sound design for the screen arts by transcending the limitations placed upon them by the technical apparatus of cinema. The chapter argues that the digital technologies and audiovisual designs of videogames create an "emotion-machine" which immerses and engages the human perceptual and emotion systems, thus intensifying the player's sense of involvement and implication in the scenes under negotiation. It also looks at BioShock as an example of the interplay between sound design, vocalization, game mechanics, and narrative. The chapter concludes by suggesting that videogame sound designers employ voices to insinuate and integrate emotions familiar from the world which prevails not far from the game's world. Marijuana is often used for relaxation, therefore, it is not surprising that the endocannabinoid system is critically involved in the regulation of emotion, anxiety and mood. In preclinical animal models, THC and other CB1 agonists produce a biphasic effect on anxiety, with low doses reducing anxiety (by blocking the release of the excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate) and high doses promoting anxiety (by blocking the release of the inhibitory neurotransmitter, GABA). As well, CBD reduces anxiety in both preclinical and clinical research, but by a non-CB1 mechanism of action. One of the most promising treatments for cannabinoids is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Considerable preclinical animal research and small-scale clinical trials have shown that activation of the endocannabinod system may promote extinction of aversive memories. The endocannabinoid system regulates the action of the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal (HPA) Axis, which controls the release of stress hormones. The second chapter introduces the evolutionary perspective on social cognition, emphasizing the prioritorizing of survival and reproduction as basic human motives. It then describes an example of the interaction between genes and environment that directs evolution, before considering the universality of emotions as an example of the product of evolutionary pressures shaped by social motives that stem from the basic human motives. It then addresses the how and why questions surrounding humans' advanced social and intellectual abilities, pinpointing spontaneous social cognition and gesture and language respectively. It then explores modern environmental pressures that continue to guide human beings' social and intellectual evolution. The human amygdala is critical for social cognition from faces. Here, we review the insights that have been gained from human single neuron recordings on how the human amygdala represents social information, with a focus on emotional faces. We review data that shows that a substantial proportion of amygdala neurons respond to facial stimuli. We identify and describe two distinct populations: whole face neurons and part neurons. The former respond holistically to the presentation of whole faces only whereas the later respond specifically to the presence of the eyes or the mouth. We conclude by summarizing current challenges and next steps.
